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Abstract 
This paper examines the various conceptions of aboriginal title and the way in which they 
could influence a finding of Maori proprietary rights in the foreshore and seabed. The paper 
argues that the conception taken will have an important bearing on the effects of such a 
finding. Hingston J' s decision in the 1997 Marlborough Sounds case (presently awaiting a 
decision from the Maori Appellate Court) is used as a recent instance of discussion on the 
doctrine of aboriginal title. With respect to the foreshore, the case represents a significant 
restriction on Re the Ninety Mile Beach. It also suggests that a re-examination of the 
Crown's unburdened ownership of the foreshore is now necessary. With respect to the 
seabed, the case prompts discussion on the sort of indigenous proprietary rights which may 
exist in it. The paper argues that the source of the Crown's territorial sovereignty over the 
seabed, may be an important factor in determining this. Finally, the paper outlines some 
possible impacts of Hingston J' s finding on the coastal permitting regime in the Resource 
Management Act 1991. The potential effects of other conceptions of aboriginal title are also 
introduced. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, and bibliography) compnses 
approximately 15, 800 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The doctrine of aboriginal title has always been recognised in New Zealand. 1 Unlike their 
Australian counterparts, New Zealand Maori were regarded as having some property rights 
in the land they occupied. It was not until the watershed case of Mabo in 1992 that 
Australian Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders were recognised as having similar property 
rights.2 Most of the controversy surrounding the doctrine in New Zealand has centred on the 
modes of extinguishing aboriginal title and the nature and incidents that any unextinguished 
title could possess. 
This paper examines the possibility that aboriginal title remams unextinguished in New 
Zealand's foreshores and seabed. This is an especially contentious issue for Maori who have 
consistently maintained that foreshores and the seabed are just as important to their 
customary way of life as any portion of terra firma. A case before Hingston J in the Maori 
Land Court in October 1997 reflects this concern and provides the focus for this paper's 
discussion of aboriginal title. The case centres on marine farms in the Marlborough Sounds 
whose businesses are based on coastal permits issued under the Resource Management Act 
1991 (RMA). Important issues arise from the possibility of unextinguished aboriginal title. 
The extent to which the validity of these permits may be affected by unextinguished title is 
traversed in Part VI of the paper. 
This paper argues that the resolution of these issues may depend on the conception of 
aboriginal title which is taken. The post Mabo era has raised a number of different ways in 
which aboriginal title may be analysed. These are introduced in Part III of this paper. Parts 
IV and V examine the results of previous Maori claims in foreshores and the seabed and 
how these may also influence the outcome in the Marlborough Sounds case. The ultimate 
outcome will set a precedent which may impact on many New Zealanders. The assumptions 
that the beaches and coastal waters of New Zealand are publicly owned and ultimately 
controlled by the Crown, are being challenged. New Zealanders have an interest in why this 
challenge is occurring and how it could affect their use of the waterfront. 
lThe first case which recognised aboriginal title was R v Symonds ( 1847) [1840-1932) NZPCC 387. 
2Mabo v State of Queensland (1992) 107 ALR 1 [Mabo]. 
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II IN RE MARLBOROUGH SOUNDS FORESHORE AND SEABED3 
This case concerns an application from Te Tau Thu a Maui, a confederation of eight iwi from 
the north of the South Island, for a determination that large parts of the Marlborough 
Sounds foreshore and seabed remain burdened by aboriginal title. Declarations were sought 
from Hingston J in the Maori Land Court under sections 18(1 )(h) and 131 of the Te Ture 
Whenua Maori Act that the land was Maori customary land, or alternatively under section 
18(1 )(i), that the land was held by the Crown in a fiduciary capacity for the applicant iwi. 
The Te Tau Ihu iwi were especially concerned that the issue of coastal permits under the 
RMA for the purpose of marine farming fundamentally affected their customary property 
rights over the foreshore and seabed. 
The Crown objected on the basis that the Maori Land Court lacked the jurisdiction to make 
these orders because aboriginal title to the foreshore and seabed had already been 
extinguished. The Crown argued that the New Zealand Court of Appeai's decision in In Re 
the Ninety Mile Beach was authority for this proposition with regard to the foreshore and 
was binding on the court. 4 In relation to the seabed, the Crown argued that section 7 of the 
Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977 effectively extinguished any 
customary rights which may have existed in it. 5 
An interim decision was made on 22 December 1997 regarding these preliminary questions 
of law. Evidential issues such as whether the applicant iwi in fact exercised customary rights 
over the foreshore and seabed, were not addressed by the court. Hingston J' s findings on the 
law will be examined later in the paper, although, at this stage, it is worth noting that his 
decision has since been appealed to the Maori Appellate Court. 6 
3 Jn Re Marlborough Sounds Foreshore and Seabed ( 1997) 22A Nelson MB 1 [Marlborough Sounds] . 
4Marlborough Sounds (1997) 22A Nelson MB 2. 
5Marlborough Sounds (1997) 22A Nelson MB 5. 
6"Appeal May Change Courts" The Dominion , Wellington, New Zealand, 25 April 1998, 1. 
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Ill THE DOCTRINE OF ABORIGINAL TITLE 
A General 
In lka Whenua Cooke P defined aboriginal title as " ... a compendious expression to cover the 
rights over land and water enjoyed by the indigenous or established inhabitants of a country 
up to the time of its colonisation."7 The doctrine arises independently of the Treaty of 
Waitangi and especially its land guarantee in Article TI. This gives the doctrine greater 
enforceability in New Zealand courts because the Treaty can only be enforced when it is 
specifically incorporated into a statute. 8 The doctrine of aboriginal title however is sourced 
in the common law. It is part of New Zealand law today and continues until validly 
extinguished. 9 
The extent of aboriginal title has also been considered by New Zealand courts. The most 
recent analysis was made by the Wellington High Court on 14 May 1998 in Taranaki Fish 
and Game Council v McRitchie .10 This case concerned an appeal of Becroft J' s decision in 
the Wanganui District Court that Maori could take trout without a licence because they had 
aboriginal title in it. The appeal was made on the basis that trout were an introduced species 
rather than indigenous and that therefore no customary rights could exist. The High Court 
upheld the appeal, reasoning that the taking of trout has always been regulated by legislation 
and this precluded any indigenous rights in them. 11 The decision however did not rule out 
the possibility of aboriginal title to introduced species of fish . 12 The Maori respondents have 
also indicated an intention to appeal·.13 
7Te Runanganui o Te Jka Whenua Inc Soc v A ttorney General [1994] 2 NZLR 20, 23-24 [lka Whenua] . 
8New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney General [1992] 2 NZLR 576, 603 . 
9Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer [1986] 1 NZLR 680 [Te Weehi] . 
10(14 May 1998) unreported, High Court, Wellington Registry, AP 19/97. 
l ITaranaki Fish above nlO, 24 . 
12Taranaki Fish above nlO, 22 . 
13Benjamin Richardson "Maori Customary Rights and Trout Fishing" (1998) 2 BRMB 139. 
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As well as this decision, claims to aboriginal title over other activities have been rejected. In 
Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board v Director General of Conservation, a claim to title over 
commercial whale watching permits was rejected because it was "founded on the modern 
tourist trade and distinct from anything envisaged in or any rights exercised before the 
treaty." 14 In Jka Whenua, the Court of Appeal rejected aboriginal claims to the generation of 
electricity because they too could not have been envisaged in pre-colonial times.15 
Aboriginal title claims over the foreshores however are not so novel and can be traced back 
to the Kauwaeranga decision in 1870 .16 This history of grievance suggests foreshore claims 
are likely to be more persuasive in modern courts than claims over trout, whale watching, or 
electricity generation. 
The methods of extinguishing aboriginal title and the nature and incidents of unextinguished 
aboriginal title probably depend on which conception of the doctrine is taken. All 
conceptions have played an important role in the analysis of aboriginal proprietary rights 
overseas. Their influence is also visible in New Zealand's legal history, and the preference of 
one conception over the others may have an important bearing on the outcome in the 
Marlborough Sounds case. In particular, the conception used may be important in 
determining the extent to which coastal management under the RMA must take into account 
any unextinguished title. 
B The Conception of Common Law Aboriginal Title 
This conception is based on the thesis of Kent McNeil in his book Common Law Aboriginal 
Title, and was influential in Toohey J's judgment in Mabo.17 McNeil argued that his 
conception only applied to colonies of settlement. His conception is applicable to New 
Zealand whose legal history has proceeded on the assumption it was settled.18 While some 
legal historians challenge this assumption, the content of these challenges is worthy of 
analysis in itself and will not be considered by this paper. 
14[1995] 3 NZLR 553, 559. 
15/ka Whenua above n7, 25 . 
l6Judgment reprinted in (1984) 14 VUWLR 227. 
17Kent McNeil Common Law Aboriginal Title (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989) [Common Law A boriginal 
Title]. 
18Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (Law Book Company, Sydney, 
1993) 32-33 . 
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The distinction between settled territories and territories that had been either conquered or 
ceded is important in colonial law. In a settled territory, British law applies as soon as 
settlement occurs, while in a conquered or ceded territory, local customary laws remain in 
place until explicitly changed by the Crown.19 
McNeil argued that the reception of British common law in settled territories meant that the 
common law should establish a "presumptive title" for indigenous inhabitants in their lands. 
Such a presumptive title arises out of prior occupation and would protect the private 
property rights of the indigenous people in a British legal system. McNeil called this 
presumptive title, "common law aboriginal title".
20 
In applying McNeil's analysis in Mabo, Toohey J equated aboriginal title with a fee simple 
one. This meant that the indigenous people's prior occupation was enforceable against the 
whole world because nobody (including the Crown), could show a better claim to 
possession. 21 This would also mean that unextinguished aboriginal title includes title to the 
subsurface and any minerals which lie within.
22 The Native Land Court process in New 
Zealand where aboriginal title was converted into a fee simple title, suggests New Zealand 
has been influenced significantly by this conception. 
C Brennan J's Conception of Aboriginal Title 
In Mabo, Brennan J conceived of the doctrine as being the same in settled, ceded, and 
conquered territories. McNeil's presumption that customary laws are inapplicable after 
settlement and British law must be imported to fill the legal vacuum, was not made by 
Brennan J. 23 
19Blankard v Galdy (1693) 2 Salk 411 ; 91 ER 356 and Kielly v Carson (1842) 4 Moo PC 63 ; 13 ER 225. 
20common Law Aboriginal Title above nl7. 
21Mabo above n2, 162-167. 
22common Law Aboriginal Title above nl7, 208. 
23 Mabo above n2, 41 . Brennan J stated that it made no difference to the rights of indigenous inhabitants 
whether the colony was settled or conquered. 
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Brennan J did not think aboriginal title bore any resemblance to a fee simple one. Instead, 
aboriginal title was regarded as a burden on the Crown's radical title with its nature and 
incidents determined by the customary law which existed in pre-colonial times. 
24 This would 
deny title to oil and gas for instance since they were not a part of the customary economy. 
This is probably not the situation in New Zealand. Although petroleum, gold, silver and 
uranium were nationalised by section 10 of the Crown Minerals Act 1991, many minerals are 
owned either by those who hold the fee simple title to the land in which they lie, or by those 
who hold fee simple titles to the minerals themselves. 25 
Brennan J also thought that aboriginal title could only be recognised where indigenous 
people continued to occupy the land and use it in a way which was consistent with the 
traditional uses. There would probably be no such requirement of continuity and use in 
McNeil's conception because there is no similar requirement in holding fee simple title. 
Michael Mansell also criticised this portion of Brennan J' s judgment on the basis it 
essentially limited the scope of aboriginal title to a small proportion of Aborigines in 
Australia. Many Aborigines were forcibly removed from their lands by the Crown. Their loss 
of occupation and use was certainly involuntary.26 
D Modes of Extinguishment 
The methods of extinguishing aboriginal title also depend on whether McNeil's or Brennan 
J's conception is used. For instance, Brennan J held that aboriginal title could be 
extinguished either by statute or by a Crown grant of the freehold or leasehold title which 
was inconsistent with continued use of the aboriginal title. 
27 This mode of extinguishment 
illustrates Brennan J' s conception of aboriginal title as an interest which is less than a 
freehold or a leasehold one. Michael Mansell argues that this view is racist because it 
reinforces the view that indigenous people's interests in land are something less than the 
interests of Europeans. 28 
24Brennan J's approach was approved in Wik v State of Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1 [Wik] . 
25However this does not apply to fee simple titles which are traceable to a Crown grant under the Lands Act 
1948. Section 59 of this Act reserved minerals to the Crown. 
26Michael Mansell "The Court Gives An Inch But Talces Another Mile" ( 1992) vol 2, no 57 ALB 6 ["The 
Court Gives An Inch"]. 
27 Since section 238 of the Native Title Act was passed in Australia in 1993, the Crown grant must now be 
statutory for extinguishment to occur. 
28"The Court Gives An Inch" above n26, 6. 
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Toohey J suggested (although did not decide) that aboriginal title could not be extinguished 
by statute even where the legislation was clear and plain. 29 This is probably because the 
common law seeks to protect lawful fee simple owners. In New Zealand there is also 
authority to suggest that aboriginal title cannot be extinguished by an inconsistent Crown 
grant unless there is legislative authority to do so. The grantee's interest in such a case 
would be taken subject to the aboriginal title. 30 
Statutory extinguishment however has occurred m New Zealand. The most important 
statutory provision for this purpose was section 84 of the Native Lands Act 1909 which 
became section 155 of the Maori Affairs Act 1953 (since repealed by the Te Ture Whenua 
Maori Act) . Section 155 stated: 
Except so far as may be otherwise expressly provided in any other Act, the Maori customary title to 
land shall not be available or enforceable by proceedings in any Court or in any other manner as 
against Her Majesty the Queen or against any Minister of the Crown or any person employed in any 
Department of State acting in the execution of his office. ( emphasis added) 
This provision effectively prevented Maori from asserting customary rights over the 
foreshore in the ordinary court process. This is because there was no express statutory 
enactment which would have enabled Maori to do so. Although most aboriginal proprietary 
rights had already been converted into freehold title when section 155 was enacted, it was 
this provision which resulted in Maori taking their foreshore claims to the Native Land 
Court.31 The Native Land Court became the only avenue through which their proprietary 
claims to the foreshore could be recognised and enforced. 
The most important modes of extinguishment in New Zealand were purchase and, in 
exceptional circumstances, confiscation under the New Zealand Settlements Act 1863 . Prior 
to 1862 the Crown's right of pre-emption meant it was the only party capable of purchasing 
land from Maori. 
29Mabo above n2, 162. 
3o Faulknor v Tauranga District Council [1996] l NZLR 357, 363 in approving Nireaha Tamaki v Baker 
~1901) NZPCC 371 [Faulknor] . 
1Richard Boast " In Re Ninety Mile Beach Revisited: The Native Land Court and the Foreshore in New 
Zealand Legal History" (1993) 23 VUWLR 145, 154 ["In Re Ninety Mile Beach Revisited"] . 
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After the 1862 and 1865 Native Lands Acts however, purchase could occur on the open 
market once aboriginal title had been converted into a certificate of title from the Native 
Land Court. 32 Extinguishment through purchase was based on the presumption that Maori 
possession of their lands was akin to fee simple ownership. This is of course consistent with 
McNeil's conception of aboriginal title. 
The purchase of Maori freehold land however. has been altered in New Zealand by the Te 
Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 . The High Court in Mangatu Incorporation v Valuer General 
recognised this statute as an attempt to "close the gate" on sales of Maori freehold land. 33 
Sections 146 and 147(2) of the statute show how this is done. Section 146 provides that no 
Maori freehold land may be alienated unless in accordance with this Act. Section 147(2) 
ensures that alienating owners must give the right of first refusal to those within the 
preferred classes of alienees. These preferred classes are defined in section 4 and include: the 
children of the owner, whanaunga of the owner, and other members of the hapu who are 
associated with the land. 
The Te Ture Whenua Maori Act also incudes other restrictions on alienability. For instance, 
although the Maori Land Court has the ability to convert Maori freehold land into General 
land, sections 13 5-13 7 place restrictions on their ability to do so, and decisions by them 
since 1993 reflect a reluctance to convert. 34 The 1993 Act certainly strikes a balance 
between McNeil's conception based on fee simple title and Brennan J's conception based on 
occupancy. While alienation to members of the public has been recognised as an important 
( and valuable) incident of Maori proprietary rights, the danger inherent in allowing 
indigenous people to lose connection with their land forever has also been addressed. 
Regardless of which mode is used to extinguish aboriginal title, modem authority suggests 
there is still a presumption against it and any purported extinguishment must show a "clear 
and plain intention" to do so. 35 With regard to statutory extinguishment it is unclear whether 
an intention to extinguish must be explicit in the legislation. 
32Peter Spiller, Jeremy Finn, Richard Boast A New Zealand Legal History (Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 
135-153 . 
33[1996] 2 NZLR 683, 694. 
34Mangatu Incorporation above n33 . 
35Te Weehi above n9, 691 in approving Hamlet of Baker Lake v Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development (1979) 107 DLR (3d) 513 . 
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Mahoney Jin Hamlet of Baker Lake held that if a statute's "necessary effect" was to abridge 
or abrogate a common law right then this should be enforced by the courts. Mahoney J 
thought this was as true of an aboriginal title as any other common law right.36 New 
Zealand courts however regard aboriginal title as being too important to disappear by a "side 
wind".37 The burden on the Crown in proving statutory extinguishment may indeed be 
higher in New Zealand than Canada. Faulknor v Tauranga District Council for instance held 
that statutory extinguishment could only occur by means of deliberate legislation which was 
unambiguously directed towards that end. 38 With regard to Crown purchase, any purchase 
which is less than fair or which is undertaken without the free consent of the indigenous 
people is a breach of the Crown's fiduciary obligation. Such an action may even result in a 
requirement by the Crown to pay compensation. 39 
E The Canadian Conception 
In Delgamuukw v The Queen, chiefs of the Gilksan and Wet'suwet'en (numbering between 
5,500 and 7,000 people), claimed aboriginal title over 58,000 square kilometres of British 
Columbia. 40 The Canadian Supreme Court overruled the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal's decision that there was insufficient evidence to prove aboriginal title. Dicta was 
also important in determining a Canadian conception of aboriginal title. The Canadian 
conception probably lies somewhere between McNeil's notion which rests solely on the 
common law imported into settled colonies, and Brennan J' s notion which examines 
aboriginal title with reference to the customary law.41 
This conception has an important impact on the nature of aboriginal title. Delgamuukw held 
that fee simple ownership should not be recognised (unlike McNeil) because lands held 
under aboriginal title cannot be used in a manner that is "irreconcilable with the nature of the 
attachment to the land which forms the basis of the group's claim to aboriginal title." 
36(1979) 107 DLR (3d) 513 , 551. 
37 Fau/knor above n30 . 
38Faulknor above n30 . 
39Te Runanga o Muriwhenua Inc v Attorney General (1990] 2 NZLR 641 , 655 ; Te Runanga o Wharekauri 
Rekohu Inc v Attorney General (1993] 2 NZLR 301 , 306; Ika Whenua above n7, 23-24. 
40(1998) 153 DLR (4th) 193 [Delgamuukw] . 
41Maori LR Dec 1997/Jan 1998 6. 
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Fee simple ownership would threaten the continuity of the relationship that indigenous 
people should have with their land.42 However the conception is also different to Brennan 
J' s notion where the nature and incidents of aboriginal title are determined solely by 
customary law. For instance, Delgamuukw held that land occupied under aboriginal title 
could be used for purposes unconnected with former practices or customs.43 This meant 
indigenous people could exploit oil reserves for example. Presumably this would only be the 
case where such a purpose would not prevent the indigenous people from using the land in a 
way they have customarily used it. As noted on page 10, this reasoning has been followed to 
a certain extent in New Zealand. 
Delgamuukw held that evidence of both prior and present occupation was required to 
establish aboriginal title. However the Court held that this evidence did not require "an 
unbroken chain of continuity" (Brennan J's conception would require this) . Indeed the Court 
thought this requirement would be unfair especially where indigenous occupation was 
disrupted simply because European colonisers were unwilling to recognise aboriginal title. 44 
The nature of occupation was also discussed. As long as a substantial connection between 
the people and the land was maintained it was not regarded as important if the precise nature 
of occupation had changed. 45 This is consistent with the observations of all the Mabo 
judges. 
The Canadian conception also makes interesting observations regarding extinguishment. 
Delgamuukw held that aboriginal title was alienable only to the Crown.46 This is of course 
different to McNeil's conception which would enable aboriginal title (being similar to a fee 
simple) to be alienable to anyone. It is also different to the statutory regime historically 
enacted in New Zealand. Once aboriginal title had been through the Native Land Court 
process, it too was alienable to anyone.47 
42Maori LR, above n41 , 7. 
43 Delgamuukw above n40, 243-246. 
44Delgamuukw above n40, 257. 
45 Delgamuukw above n40, 258. 
46Delgamuukw above n40, 241. 
47 Although, as noted on page 12, the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 has placed restrictions on this. 
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Delgamuukw is authority for the proposition that alienation of aboriginal title to the Crown 
could only occur where there was some consideration for it. 48 This would appear to exclude 
extinguishment by either the simple passage of a statute or making an inconsistent Crown 
grant. These of course were two legitimate modes of extinguishment in Brennan J' s opinion. 
The finding is also consistent with the earlier Canadian case of Guerin v The Queen.49 In 
Guerin, Dickson J held that alienation of aboriginal title imposed an obligation on the Crown 
to only deal with the land in the future for the indigenous people' s benefit. 5° Canadian 
authority therefore supports Cooke P ' s observations in Jka Whenua that the extinguishment 
of aboriginal title requires proper compensation to be paid by the Crown. 51 
The compensation requirement arose from characterising the relationship between Indian 
and the Crown as fiduciary or trustlike in nature. Both Guerin and Delgamuukw made 
observations to this effect. 52 The fiduciary concept has been approved in New Zealand and 
is particularly relevant to the Marlborough Sounds case. 53 As noted on page 6, section 
18(1)(i) of the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act provides for land being held by the Crown as 
fiduciary for Maori . As well as the compensation requirement, a further ancillary of a 
fiduciary relationship is the emphasis on consultation. In Delgamuukw, Lamer CJC stressed 
that the Indian people were an important participant in the development and management of 
resources on their lands. 54 The extent of this consultation requirement will be explored later 
in this paper. 
48Delgamuukw above n40, 265 . 
49(1985) 13 DLR (4th) 321. 
50Guerin above n49, 339. 
5llka Whenua above n7. 
52Guerin above n49, 334; Delgamuukw above n40, 264-265. 
53 lka Whenua above n7, 24. 
54 Delgamuukw above n40, 264. 
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F McHugh's Non-Territorial Aboriginal Title55 
In a 1984 article Paul McHugh conceived of unextinguished aboriginal title as being 
non-territorial in nature. 56 This meant that while aboriginal title to land may have been 
legitimately extinguished using one of the modes examined on pages 10 to 13, this did not 
necessarily extinguish other indigenous rights connected with the land. McHugh in The 
Maori Magna Carta, used the hunting and fishing rights of Canadian Indians over Crown 
land, as an example of aboriginal title, non-territorial in nature, which remained 
unextinguished. 57 
McHugh regarded non-territorial title as being similar to profits-a-prendre, which is a third 
party's right to go onto another party's land and remove some of the fruits of the land (such 
as water or fish). 58 One New Zealand case has described non-territorial title as being similar 
to an easement, which is governed by similar common law rules as profits-a-prendre. 59 
McHugh has also used the term "aboriginal servitudes" to describe this form of aboriginal 
title.60 
As McHugh has acknowledged however, the main problem with this conception is the 
"indefeasibility of title" rule inherent in New Zealand's Torrens system of land transfer.61 
That is, fee simple owners take title subject only to the interests noted on their certificate. 
Indeed in its Ngai Tahu report, the Waitangi Tribunal declined to recommend that 
certificates of title should be encumbered with any aboriginal title. 62 However the argument 
for recognising non-territorial aboriginal title may be stronger with regard to New Zealand's 
foreshores and seabed. In general these pieces of land have not been Crown granted. There 
is no fee simple title to them, which a non-territorial title would encumber. 
55Note that in his analysis McHugh appears to have been primarily influenced by McNeil's conception of 
aboriginal title. 
56Paul McHugh "The Legal Status of Maori Fishing Rights in Tidal Waters" (1984) 14 VUWLR 247 ["The 
Legal Status of Maori Fishing Rights"] . 
57Paul McHugh The Maori Magna Carta: New Zealand Law and the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University 
Press, Auckland, 1991) 138 [The Maori Magna Carta]. 
58The Maori Magna Carta above n57. 
59Kauwaeranga above n16. 
60Paul McHugh "Aboriginal Servitudes and the Land Transfer Act" (1986) 16 VUWLR 313. 
61 The Maori Magna Carta above n57, 140. 
62waitangi Tribunal, Ngai Tahu Report (Wai 27) 916-919. 
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IV FORESHORES 
A General Principle 
For the purposes of the Marlborough Sounds case, the relevant definition of the foreshore is 
contained in section 2 of the RMA: "Any land covered and uncovered by the flow and ebb 
of the tide at mean spring tides." The general common law presumption is that the foreshore 
is owned by the Crown by prerogative.63 Neither McNeil nor Brennan J made this 
presumption with regard to terra firma. Indeed the general presumption was in favour of 
aboriginal title as long as certain evidential requirements were met. McNeil thought 
foreshores were an exception. In McNeil's opinion this was because foreshores have always 
been unoccupied and are therefore analogous to waste lands which belong presumptively to 
the Crown rather than presumptively to the occupier. 64 
It is questionable however whether this analogy should be persuasive. Regarding coastlines 
as being similar to waste lands appears inaccurate given the various activities and ways in 
which the coastal area has been utilised by all cultures throughout history. Certainly in New 
Zealand, Maori have never regarded the foreshore in this way. The foreshore has always 
been a vital source of fish, shellfish and seabirds and in pre-colonial times was also an 
important right of passage around the coastline. Indeed it is unlikely that the presumption of 
Crown ownership is part of New Zealand law. In Re the Ninety Mile Beach TA Gresson J 
stated that the acceptance of this rule '\vould involve a serious infringement of the spirit of 
the Treaty of Waitangi and would in effect amount to depriving the Maoris of their 
customary rights over the foreshore by a side wind rather than an express enactment. "65 
Even if the presumption of Crown ownership had been accepted in Re the Ninety Mile 
Beach it would still be rebuttable by subjects who can show continuous occupation of 
sufficient duration for a Crown grant to be presumed. 66 This is known as the doctrine of 
adverse possession. 
63 Halsbury 's Laws of England (4ed, Butterworths, London, 1980) vol 18, para 1418. 
64Common Law A boriginal Title above nl7, 104. 
65(1963] NZLR 461 , 477. 
66A G v Portsmouth (1877) 25 WR 559. 
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The doctrine involves Real Property Law principles rather than recourse to aboriginal title 
and remains an interesting avenue through which Maori could claim title to the foreshore. 
Adverse possession is based on the premise that possession (both factual and an intention to 
possess) remains the root of title. 67 Adverse possessors can dispossess the true owner and 
claim title to the land they possess when certain requirements are satisfied. Cooper J in 
McDonell v Giblin held that the possession relied upon must be "actual, open and manifest, 
exclusive and continuous. "68 This means that the possession must be sufficiently obvious to 
give the true owner the means of knowledge that some person has entered into possession 
adversely to her title. It also means that a person, living in the locality and passing the 
allotment from time to time, would be able to observe that some person had taken 
possession of the land. As well as these requirements, it is likely that an adverse possessor 
must also have the intention of excluding the true owner as well as other persons. 69 
The possibility of adverse possession claims to some portions of the foreshore, such as creek 
beds or tidal streams, has already been raised. 70 These claims would probably be made by 
those who hold title to adjoining properties. There appears no reason in principle why a 
_claim of adverse possession over an entire foreshore could not be made as long as the 
McDonell requirements were met. McDonell's exclusivity requirement may be particularly 
difficult to satisfy. However, apart from this, provided Maori, for the requisite period of 60 
years (required by section 7(1) of the Limitation Act 1950) have both maintained their claim 
to a particular foreshore and continued the series of possessory acts in respect of it, and no 
claim by the Crown has interrupted the period, an adequate claim to adverse possessory title 
may be made out. 71 
While adverse possession provides an interesting possibility for Maori claimants, this part of 
the paper discusses the claims of aboriginal title which have been made over New Zealand 
foreshores . The impact of the conceptions discussed in the previous section will be 
considered in relation to two important cases: Kauwaeranga and Re the Ninety Mile Beach. 
67Frederick Pollock and Robert Wright An Essay on Possession in the Common Law (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1888) 94-95 . 
68(1904) 23 NZLR 660 at 662-663 applied in Cotton v Keogh [1996] 3 NZLR 1, 7. 
69Hinde, McMoreland and Sim Butterworths Land Law in New Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington, 1997) 
~ras 2.182, 2.187. 
~ Brookfield "Prescription and Adverse Possession" in GW Hinde (ed) The New Zealand Torrens 
ri_stem Centennial Essays (Butterworths, Wellington, 1971) 162. 
1"Prescription and Adverse Possession" above n70, 204. 
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Although Kauwaeranga was concerned with the initial recognition of aboriginal title while 
Re the Ninety Mile Beach was concerned with extinguishment, both decisions provide 
insights into how aboriginal title has been perceived in New Zealand and how it may be 
perceived in the Marlborough Sounds case. 
B Kauwaeranga 72 
This was a judgment by Fenton CJ in the Native Land Court in December 1870. It was 
referred to in the judgments in Re the Ninety Mile Beach although little comment was 
passed on its persuasiveness. The issue was whether Maori inhabitants could claim a 
certificate of title (by converting their aboriginal title into a Crown derived freehold one) to a 
piece of Shortland foreshore. Fenton CJ initially held as a matter of fact, that the foreshore 
had been occupied by the Maori claimants according to their customs and usages. In 
particular, the foreshore had been used for generations for fishing with stake nets and as a 
private ground for gathering pipis. 73 
Fenton CJ recognised aboriginal title as a legitimate burden on the Crown's right to govern. 
He thought the Treaty ofWaitangi itself provided ample evidence of this. 74 The exact nature 
of the aboriginal title caused greater difficulties. Fenton CJ refused to issue a certificate of 
title to the fee simple in the soil because he was concerned that such an award could 
preclude the public from passing over the beach to the sea. 75 His concern therefore was a 
public policy one. 
Instead Fenton CJ awarded to the claimants "the full, exclusive, and undisturbed possession 
of all the rights and privileges over the locus in quo (the foreshore) which they or their 
ancestors have ever exercised."76 The effect of categorising aboriginal title in this way was, 
in Fenton CJ' s opinion, to create a privilege or easement over the foreshore in favour of the 
claimants. Since easements are now a registrable interest under the Land Transfer Act 1952, 
they themselves create a type of fee simple estate. It is unlikely however that Fenton CJ was 
referring to an easement in this strict sense. 
72Judgment reprinted in (1984) 14 VUWLR 227 [Kauwaeranga] . 
73 Kauwaeranga above n72, 229. 
74Kauwaeranga above n72, 240. 
; 5 Kauwaeranga above n72, 244 . Fenton CJ agrees with Best J in Blundell v Catteral/ (1821) 106 ER 1190. 
6Kauwaeranga above n72, 245 . 
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Fenton CJ was mainly concerned with preserving the claimant's right to take shellfish from 
the foreshore .77 Section 23 of the Native Lands Act 1865 enabled him to do this. This 
section provides: 
... shall order a certificate of title to be made and issued which certificate shall specify the names 
of the persons or of the tribe who own or are interested in the land describing the nature of such 
estate or interest and describing the land comprised in such certificate or the Court may in its 
discretion refuse to order a certificate to issue to the claimant or any other person. (emphasis 
added) 
Section 23 allowed Fenton CJ to recognise an aboriginal interest in the foreshore which was 
less than a fee simple one. This is inconsistent with McNeil ' s conception, at least in relation 
to terra firma. McNeil thought that the first possessors of land, determined by the fact of 
occupation, had a fee simple title.78 "Ownership" is provided for in section 23 above and 
considering the evidence Fenton CJ heard in relation to Maori use of the foreshore, there 
are strong arguments for suggesting that their rights as first occupiers required a fee simple 
title. 
Fenton CJ's decision was probably more consistent with Brennan J's reasoning in Mabo. 
Brennan J also refused to recognise aboriginal title as being similar to a fee simple and 
regarded it as more of an occupation right instead. The right of Maori to take fish from the 
foreshore appears more consistent with a right to occupy that location in order to fish rather 
than a right to own the foreshore itself. The disadvantage for Maori with this conception is 
that Crown actions involving the foreshore, such as grants of a freehold or leasehold title in 
it, would extinguish the aboriginal title. 79 Of greater persuasion is the Canadian approach 
which requires some form of consideration from the Crown for any extinguishment. 
Customary easements are also consistent with McHugh' s approach. McHugh insisted that 
actions by the Crown over the foreshore which were inconsistent with customary ownership, 
extinguished Maori territorial title only. 
77 Kauwaeranga above n72, 244. 
78Common Law Aboriginal Title above nl 7, 298-299. 
79 Mabo above n2, 51 . 
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Crown actions did not extinguish their non-territorial right to occupy the foreshore and 
exercise fishing and hunting rights over it_80 In this respect at least, McHugh's conception of 
aboriginal title appears to acknowledge aboriginal rights which other conceptions would not. 
C Re the Ninety Mile Beach 81 
In this case the Court of Appeal held that the Native Land Court lacked jurisdiction to 
investigate title into foreshore (that is, the process under the Native Lands Acts of 1862 and 
1865 where aboriginal title is converted into a fee simple one). There were two reasons for 
this. Firstly, the Court of Appeal agreed with Turner J in the Supreme Court that section 
147 of the Harbours Act 1878 (succeeded by section 150 of the Harbours Act 1950) 
deprived the Maori Land Court of jurisdiction to issue a fee simple order. Section 14 7 
provided that: "no part of the foreshore was to be granted or given away other than with the 
authority of a special Act of Parliament." 
It is questionable however whether this provision necessarily extinguishes aboriginal title. 
Indeed Turner J in the High Court expressed concern that "so sweeping a provision" should 
be found in this Act. 82 Certainly the provision does not mention extinguishment. It is also 
important to note that under all the conceptions of aboriginal title none require a conveyance 
nor a grant from Parliament to be valid. Indeed McNeil outlined other instances where title 
does not have to be derived from a Crown grant to be valid.83 The status of section 147 as 
an extinguishment provision therefore is highly dubious. 
Secondly, the Court of Appeal held that when coastal blocks adjoining the foreshore had 
been through the Maori Land Court process, aboriginal title to the foreshore itself was 
necessarily extinguished. 84 Thus, where a Crown grant was made to a coastal block 
specifying the sea as the boundary (no specific allowance for foreshores appear to have been 
made in Crown grants), the foreshore would either vest with the holder of the grant, or 
"remain" with the Crown itself 85 
80Pau1 McHugh "The Legal Status of Maori Fishing Rights in Tidal Waters" (1984) 14 VUWLR 247,267. 
81Re the Ninety Mile Beach [1963] NZLR 461 (CA) [Re the Ninety Mile Beach]. 
82[1960] NZLR 673 , 677. 
83 Common Law Aboriginal Title above nl7, 300. 
84Re the Ninety Mile Beach above n81 , 473 . 
85Re the Ninety Mile Beach above n81, 473 . 
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This second finding by the Court of Appeal has also been widely criticised. The notion that 
aboriginal title to one piece of land is extinguishable by a Native Land Court investigation 
into another, adjoining piece of land, is surely an unfair one. One author has suggested that 
the notion is unlikely to be accepted by contemporary courts. 86 
As with Fenton CJ in Kauwaeranga, public policy concerns were foremost in the reasoning. 
North J stated that recognising a fee simple title in the foreshore would have "startling" and 
"inconvenient" results. However, while Fenton CJ recognised a customary easement despite 
this, no aboriginal rights over the foreshore at all were acknowledged by the Court of 
Appeal. This could be because the applicable legislation had changed since Kauwaeranga. 
Section 161 of the Maori Affairs Act 1953 was now in force and this provided: 
(1) The Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to investigate the title to customary land, and to 
determine the relative interests of the owners thereof. 
(2) Every title to and interest in customary land shall be determined according to the ancient 
customs and usages of the Maori people, as far as the same can be ascertained. 
(3) On any investigation of title and determination of relative interests under this section the 
Court shall make an order (in this Act called a freehold order) defining the area so dealt with, 
naming the persons found entitled thereto, and specifying their relative interests in the land 
( emphasis added) 
Section 162 provided: 
Every freehold order shall on the making thereof have the effect of vesting the land therein 
referred to in the persons therein named for a legal estate in fee simple in possession, in the same 
manner as if the land had been then granted to those persons by the Crown, and the land shall be 
deemed to have been so granted accordingly, and shall thereupon cease to be customary land and 
shall become Maori freehold land. ( emphasis added) 
86"In Re Ninety Mile Beach Revisited" above n3 l , 169. 
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Therefore the option for the Maori Land Court to award an aboriginal title which was less 
than a fee simple one had been taken away by the legislation. 
87 Because of the public policy 
concerns in awarding a fee simple title to the foreshore, the Court of Appeal decided that 
Maori could not be awarded anything at all. This was because, as noted on page 11, section 
15 5 of the 195 3 Act also prevented Maori from asserting customary title independently of 
the Maori Land Court process. The inability of the Maori Land Court to award anything less 
than a fee simple title probably continues today. According to section 129 of the Te Ture 
Whenua Maori Act 1993, the Maori Land Court can only recognise land as having one of 
the statuses listed. In section 129(1) these statuses include: Maori customary land, Maori 
freehold land, General land owned by Maori, General land, Crown land, and Crown land 
reserved for Maori. Section 129(2)( c )-(f) indicates that it is the estate in fee simple which 
must be recognised by the Court once the conversion from Maori customary land has 
occurred. 
The restriction of the Maori Land Court's jurisdiction since Kauwaeranga means that it is 
only McNeil's conception of aboriginal title which can be recognised by this forum. While 
this conception probably entails more legal rights for Maori than any other, it also means 
that higher courts may be reluctant to allow it . The public policy concerns with freehold 
ownership of the foreshore were traversed both in Kauwaeranga and Re the Ninety Mile 
Beach and may pro_vide the basis for denying the Maori Land Court jurisdiction in this area, 
even today. 
The other avenue through which a McNeil type aboriginal title could be enforced is through 
a declaratory judgment by the High Court. As noted earlier, section 155 of the Maori Affairs 
Act 1953 effectively closed this avenue also. Section 155 was subsequently repealed by the 
Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 . This raised the possibility that civil actions against the 
Crown for this form of aboriginal title could once more be brought through the ordinary 
court process. 88 This possibility has since been removed however by amendments to the 
Limitation Act 1950. 89 
87"The Legal Status of Maori Fishing Rights" above n56, 260. 
88Paul McHugh "The Legal Basis for Maori Claims Against the Crown" (1988) 18 VUWLR 1, 7. 
89section 361 of the Limitation Amendment Act 1993 imposes a limitation of 12 years from the date the 
action accrued to recover possession of Maori customary land. 
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D Post Re the Ninety Mile Beach 
1 The fisheries cases 
Two High Court cases concerning customary fishing 'rights over the foreshore provide useful 
indications of how Re the Ninety Mile Beach has been applied in New Zealand. Te Weehi v 
Regional Fisheries Officer was the first of these cases. It centred on aboriginal title being 
used as a defence to a charge of possessing undersized paua contrary to regulation 8( 1 )(b) 
of the Fisheries ( Amateur Fishing) Regulations 1983 . 90 
The defendant, of Ngati Porou descent, argued that he had an aboriginal right to take 
shellfish for his own personal use. The defence was successful. Williamson J was careful to 
highlight that the claim was not based on any rights to the soil of the foreshore itself 
91 Re 
the Ninety Mile Beach was therefore distinguishable on this basis. Instead Williamson J 
based his decision on McHugh' s notion of a non-territorial title to the shellfish which 
remained unextinguished. 92 It was acknowledged therefore that the aboriginal right to take 
shellfish was severable from the ownership of the foreshore from which they were taken. 
Te Weehi may be compared with the later case of Green v Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries. 93 This case was concerned with a charge of possessing undersized to hero a in 
breach of regulation 22 of the Fisheries (Amateur Fishing) Regulations 1986. Once again the 
defendants claimed aboriginal property rights in the shellfish they had taken. However in this 
instance, the claim to aboriginal title was an exclusive one, exclusive to the defendant's tribe, 
and based on ownership or control of the foreshore . Te Weehi, which decided a claim to 
non-territorial title, was distinguishable because of this. The defence was unsuccessful on the 
basis of the Re the Ninety Mile Beach principle which Greig J applied.
94 That is, Native 
Land Court investigation into the adjoining coastal blocks automatically extinguished Maori 
customary rights to the foreshore . Greig J assumed that such investigation had occurred in 
the case before him. 95 
90[1986] 1 NZLR 680 [Te Weehi] . 
9 lre Weehi above n90, 696. 
92re Weehi above n90, 692. 
93 [1990] 1 NZLR 411. 
94Green above n93 , 414. 
95Green above n93 , 414. 
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These cases are undoubtedly correct on the scope of the Re the Ninety Mile Beach principle, 
even though little comment was passed on the persuasiveness of the principle itself 
Williamson J's judgment in Te Weehi is of particular interest because it suggests that 
aboriginal title of some sort, remains in the foreshores . Although McNeil's fee simple 
conception is inapplicable to a Re the Ninety Mile Beach situation, the other conceptions are 
not. 
2 Hingston J's reasoning on foreshores in the Marlborough Sounds case 
The case concerned a claim of aboriginal title to the soil of the foreshore . 
96 Because the case 
was heard before the Maori Land Court, the title claimed could only be converted into a fee 
simple one. As noted on page 23, according to the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act, this was the 
only determination which the Maori Land Court could make. Hingston J accepted initially 
that the ratio in Re the Ninety Mile Beach was binding on him. 
97 This is simply because the 
Court of Appeal is of higher authority than the Maori Land Court. Hingston J accepted that 
he was bound by the finding that once the Maori Land Court had determined title to the 
coastal blocks then aboriginal title to the foreshore was extinguished also. 
98 
Re the Ninety Mile Beach was ultimately distinguished by Hingston J on the basis that the 
coastal blocks in the Marlborough Sounds had not been through the Maori Land Court 
process. Instead, they had been purchased by the Crown. He refused to extend the Court of 
Appeal's principle to the present case because this would allow aboriginal title to be 
extinguished by a "side wind" and also because he thought New Zealand jurisprudence in the 
past decade had paid greater regard to Maori interests. 
99 These concerns also led Hingston J 
to question the reasoning behind the Re the Ninety Mile Beach principle itself He suggested 
that a modern Court of Appeal may well change their conclusion on this matter. 100 
96The full nature of the claim may be found on page 6 of the paper. 
97Mar/borough Sounds (1997) 22A Nelson MB 2. 
98Mar/borough Sounds (1997) 22A Nelson MB 3. 
99Marlborough Sounds (1997) 22A Nelson MB 4. 
lOOMarlborough Sounds above n99. 
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3 Summary of aboriginal title in the foreshore 
At the present time, Re the Ninety Mile Beach remains good la
w. The Maori Land Court 
investigation of adjoining coastal blocks necessarily exting
uished aboriginal title to the 
foreshores. Recent New Zealand cases however which stress
 that any extinguishment must 
show a clear and plain intention to do so means that the Co
urt of Appeal today may well 
overturn the decision. Certainly Hingston J's decision in the
 Marlborough Sounds case is 
indicative of this. 
Even if the public policy concerns of private foreshore owne
rship, evident in Kauwaeranga 
and Re the Ninety Mile Beach, prevented this from happenin
g, an obligation upon the 
Crown to pay compensation to dispossessed iwi, is more lik
ely than ever before. IOI Also 
more likely is the obligation to confer with Maori before decis
ions are taken which affect the 
foreshore . These obligations arise from the unique fiduciary r
elationship between the Crown 
and Maori as discussed on page 15. 
The Marlborough Sounds decision that the purchase of coasta
l blocks do not extinguish 
aboriginal foreshore rights, could result in similar successful
 claims around New Zealand. 
Indeed most of the South Island was Crown purchased. Al
so, coastal areas around New 
Zealand Company settlements at New Plymouth, Wangan
ui, Wellington, and parts of 
Northland and Auckland, may be affected.102 
The nature of unextinguished aboriginal title in the foreshore
s will also be interesting, and 
will probably depend on which of the conceptions examined in
 this paper, proves persuasive. 
McHugh's notion of non-territorial title was accepted in Te W
eehi . Although the Maori 
Land Court does not have jurisdiction to recognise this title, 
it is still a title which could be 
pursued through the ordinary court process. While Te Weehi did
 not involve a claim to the 
foreshore as such, the right of Maori to occupy the foreshor
e to collect shellfish has been 
confirmed. McHugh thought this right was similar to an 
easement or profit-a-prendre. 
Whether this Maori right could be protected and alienated i
n the same way as these Real 
Property Law concepts would allow, remains a ground f
or future analysis. A McNeil 
approach would suggest they should. A Brennan J approach wou
ld suggest they should not. 
10lre Runanga o Muriwhenua Inc v Attorney General [1990] 
2 NZLR 641 , 655. 
102Maori LR Dec 1997/Jan 1998 5. 
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There are also strong arguments to suggest that the 
amendment to the Limitation Act 
alluded to on page 23, would not affect the recovery o
f this sort of title in the ordinary 
courts. The amendment only affects Maori customary
 land as defined by the Te Ture 
Whenua Maori Act.
103 The Te Ture Whenua Maori Act is concerned with c
onverting 
customary land into freehold land. McHugh argues that 
because non-territorial title is not a 
title for which a freehold order can be issued, it cann
ot be regarded as customary land 
either. 104 Certainly this appears to be a persuasive appr
oach. Non-territorial title relates to 
certain occupation and usage rights in the land rather tha
n a claim to the land itself Brennan 
J' s conception which centred on occupation rights would pro
bably also be outside the ambit 
of the Limitation Act for this reason. 
The Marlborough Sounds case indicates that aborigina
l proprietary claims, territorial in 
nature, are also possible. The ability of the Maori Land
 Court to investigate and convert 
customary title in foreshores into freehold means the fo
reshores also become alienable to 
others (subject to the restrictions in the Te Ture Whenua
 Maori Act) . This is consistent with 
McNeil's conception and Michael Mansell's argument th
at aboriginal title should be given 
the same legal status as a fee simple. Indeed the prospec
ts of alienating customary rights to 
non-Maori were illustrated recently by the granting of
 a customary fishing permit to a 
Pakeha by South Island Maori. Maori Affairs Minister t
he Hon Tau Henare conceded that 
this sort of practice was likely to continue. 105 
It is questionable however whether, apart from the publ
ic policy concerns, Maori freehold 
title should be granted in the foreshores . Both the 
Brennan J and the Delgamuukw 
approaches suggest that aboriginal title cannot be cha
racterised in this way. Brennan J 
conceived of aboriginal title as being the customary wa
y in which land was used. While 
Delgamuukw was not so inflexible in its conception, it 
too stressed the importance of the 
traditional relationship with the land. Delgamuukw was
 concerned that a fee simple title 
could too easily be alienated to others, in which case
 it would be lost forever to the 
indigenous people. Maori are well aware of the distress 
of this, given the aftermath of the 
1862 and 1865 Native Lands Acts. 
103 Section 360( 1) of the Limitation Amendment Act 1993
. 
104The Maori Magna Carta above n57, 140. 
105"Fishing Rules Good For All" The Dominion, Welling
ton, New Zealand, 25 July 1998, 2. 
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Although the additional protections of the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act safeguard against 
alienation to some extent, any alienation process would require careful consideration on the 
implications for future Maori. 
The public policy concerns of private foreshore ownership would also have to be addressed 
by the Crown if grants of freehold title were to occur. New Zealanders have generally 
regarded unrestricted access to the coastline as a right of citizenship. The granting of Maori 
freehold title would probably require negotiation and compromise between coastal iwi and 
the Crown, particularly in relation to the most popular beaches, if the general public's use of 
them is to be assured. 
V SEABED 
A General Principle 
For the purposes of the Marlborough Sounds case, the relevant definition of the territorial 
seabed is contained in section 7 of the Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone and Exclusive 
Economic Zone Act 1977 (the 1977 Act) : " ... bounded on the landward side by the low 
water mark along the coast of New Zealand ... and on the seaward side by the outer limits of 
the territorial sea of New Zealand." The territorial seabed stretches 12 nautical miles out 
from New Zealand's coastline and its legal status, at international law in particular, is very 
uncertain. This means that the possibility of aboriginal title in it is unclear also . 
All of the conceptions of aboriginal title discussed throughout this paper make the 
presumption that the Crown acquires territorial sovereignty to the land within its dominions. 
It is this territorial sovereignty which is burdened by aboriginal title. 106 The conceptions of 
aboriginal title only differ on how this burden may be extinguished and on the nature of any 
unextinguished title. In relation to the territorial seabed, the initial issue in any aboriginal title 
debate is whether the Crown has actually acquired territorial sovereignty over it. Until this 
occurs, the doctrine of aboriginal title, being a proprietary right, cannot be enforced. 107 
l06Michael Mansell did argue that Brennan J's conception, if taken to its logical conclusion, would amount 
to Aboriginal sovereignty rather than Crown sovereignty. "The Court Gives An Inch" above n26, 5. This 
does not appear to have been asserted elsewhere however. 
lO? Mary Yam1irr v The Northern Territory of Australia [1998] FCA (6 July 1998) para 129 at 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/federal_ct/l 998/771.html> (last modified 6 July 1998) [Yarmirr] . 
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There are also suggestions that the Crown, while acquiring territorial sovereign
ty in the 
seabed, only acquires a limited form of sovereignty from which no proprieta
ry rights, 
including aboriginal title, can be recognised. The determination of these issues wi
ll depend 
on the source of any Crown title to the seabed. There are three possible sources: se
ction 7 of 
the 1977 Act, the common law, and international law. Each of these source
s will be 
examined in this section in tum. 
B Possible Sources of Territorial Sovereignty 
1 The nature of section 7 of the 1977 Act 
Section 7 reads: 
Subject to the grant of any estate or interest therein (whether by or pursuant to the 
provisions of any enactment or otherwise, and whether made before or after the comm
encement 
of this Act), the seabed and subsoil of submarine areas bounded on the landward side 
by the 
low-water mark along the coast of New Zealand (including the coast of all islands) an
d on the 
seaward side by the outer limits of the territorial sea of New Zealand shall be deemed to b
e and 
always to have been vested in the Crown. (emphasis added) 
If section 7 is regarded as the ultimate source of the Crown's territorial sovereignty
 over the 
seabed, then it is likely that aboriginal claims to the seabed will be limited to 
claims of 
adverse possession. This is because adverse possession results in a presumed Cro
wn grant 
and "grants of estates or interest" are the only qualification in section 7 to the Cro
wn's title. 
The requirements for adverse possession in relation to foreshores were discussed
 on page 
18. The same requirements, elucidated by McDonell v Giblin, would have to be satisfie
d to 
show adverse possession in the seabed. Although there is little authority on this, th
e case of 
Fowley Marine v Gafford raised the possibility (although the case was not decided on
 this 
point), that adverse possession could be a basis for proving good title for certain
 mooring 
rights in the seabed.108 As with the foreshores however, there are likely to 
be major 
evidential obstacles for Maori in proving adverse possession. The McDonell requireme
nt of 
exclusivity in particular could be difficult to satisfy. 
108(1968] 2 QB 618; [1968] l All ER 979. 
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Apart from adverse possession, if the Crown's sovereignty was sour
ced in the 1977 Act then 
Maori would probably have no claim because title would be sta
tutorily ''vested" in the 
Crown. 
However, it is unlikely section 7 would be viewed by the courts
 as a vesting provision. 
Observations of FB Adams J in AG ex re/ Hutt River Board v Lei
ghton are especially 
relevant. 109 This case concerned the interpretation of section 261 
of the Coal Mines Act 
1979 which was worded in a very similar way to section 7 of the 1
977 Act above. Section 
261 provided: 
Save where the bed of a navigable river is or has been granted by th
e Crown, the bed of such 
river shall remain and shall be deemed to have always been vested i
n the Crown and, without 
limiting in any way the rights of the Crown thereto, all minerals (in
cluding coal) within such bed 
shall be the absolute property of the Crown. ( emphasis added) 
FB Adams J reconsidered the assumption made in Re Bed of the Wan
ganui River that this 
provision vested title in the navigable river to the Crown: 110 
The operative words are "shall remain and shall be deemed to have
 always been vested in the 
Crown." These are not words purporting to vest or divest anything.
 The words "shall remain" 
look to the future, and the other words look back to the past, and th
ere are no words operative in 
praesenti such as one would expect to find if the purpose were to div
est interests already 
alienated from the Crown and to revest them in the Crown. This is 
the sort of thing one expects 
in a declaratory enactment; and in my opinion, the wording tells str
ongly against the theory that 
any divesting of private rights already acquired was intended. 
In essence therefore, the provision was regarded as merely declarato
ry of the state of affairs 
which already existed. It is likely that section 7 of the 1977 Act woul
d be viewed in the same 
way. That is, it could not be viewed as divesting any proprieta
ry rights which already 
existed. 
109(1955] NZLR 750, 789-790. 
l lO[l955] NZLR 419. 
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This view would also be consistent with the New Zealand
 judiciary's opinion in recent years 
that indigenous rights should not be extinguished by a "
side wind". 111 There is nothing in 
the language of section 7 which purports to extinguish
. This view would also mean that 
Crown title over the seabed could only be sourced in the c
ommon law or international law. 
The statute is clearly distinguishable from the statutory
 provision in Australia which does 
vest title in the seabed to the Crown. Section 4(1) of th
e Coastal Waters (State Title) Act 
1990 (Cth) provides: 
... vests in each State the same rights and title to property
 in the seabed beneath the coastal 
waters of the State, and the same rights in respect of the 
space above the seabed, as would 
belong to the State if that seabed were within the limits o
f the State. 
Since Mabo, the State's radical title within the limits of the 
State is burdened by aboriginal 
title. The nature of this burden is similar to Brennan J' s con
ception discussed above. This 
conception is good law in Australia according to the Wik
 case.112 That is, aboriginal title in 
Australia is analogous to an occupation right rather than 
a fee simple. Section 4(1) provides 
for the State's title over their seabeds to be burdened 
in the same way. Although New 
Zealand courts could not interpret section 7 of the 1977
 Act in a similar manner, as noted 
earlier, it is unlikely they would interpret it as explicit 
enough to extinguish any possible 
aboriginal title in the seabed. 113 
2 Applicability of the common law to the seabed 
If Crown title to the New Zealand seabed is sourced in
 the common law then important 
consequences for aboriginal title result from this . This is 
because the New Zealand common 
law recognises aboriginal title as a legitimate burden on th
e Crown's territorial sovereignty. 
111 Faulknor above n30, 363. 
112 Wik above n24. 
l 13 Butterworths Land Law in New Zealand above n69, p
ara 2.235 . 
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However authority is unclear as to whether the Crown acquired sovereignty ov
er the 
territorial seabed for the common law and its accompanying recognition of prop
rietary 
rights, to apply. The influential case of R v Keyn held that the Crown's sovereignty end
s at 
the low water mark and that it only has jurisdiction in certain respects beyond this.
114 For 
instance, the court in R v Keyn decided that jurisdiction over criminal acts by foreig
ners 
applied to the territorial seabed. Also, it is likely New Zealand courts would exercis
e their 
jurisdiction to uphold a general right to fish over the seabed subject to Maori cus
tomary 
fishing rights.115 Likewise, New Zealand courts would probably uphold a general r
ight to 
anchor in the seabed.116 None of these actions however are dependent on the Crown 
having 
actual proprietary interests in the seabed. 
Although no New Zealand case has required express acceptance of the R v Keyn ratio it ha
s 
been cited with approval in the Australian High Court in NSW v The Commonwealth 
(the 
Seas and Submerged Lands Case) and the Supreme Court of Canada in Re Offs
hore 
Mineral Rights of British Columbia_ 117 
One reason in R v Keyn for refusing to recognise Crown sovereignty in the territorial 
seas 
and seabed, was given by Sir R Phillimore who represented the majority in that case: 
118 
.. . the passage of two or three vessels or of a fleet over external waters may be neithe
r felt 
nor perceived. For this reason, the act of inoffensively passing over such portions of
 water, 
without any violence committed there, is not considered as any violation of territory
 
belonging to a neutral state; permission is not usually require~ such waters are cons
idered 
as the common thoroughfare of nations, though they may be so far territory as that an
y actual 
exercise of hostility is prohibited therein. (emphasis added) 
l 14[1876] 2 Ex D 63 [Keyn] . 
115Te Weehi above n90. 
116canadian authority certainly supports this. Attorney General for British Columbia v A
ttorney General 
for Canada [1914] AC 153, 169. 
117(1975) 135 CLR337 and [1967] SCR 792. 
l 18Keyn above nl 14, 77. Sir R Phillimore cites with approval an observation by Lord Sto
well in The Twee 
Gebroeders 3 C Rob 352. 
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The "common thoroughfare of nations" has since become a customary international law 
right for foreign ships to enjoy innocent passage around the territorial seas.
119 R v Keyn also 
held that the territorial sea, while outside the realm, could be brought within the territory of 
England by an Act of the Imperial Parliament.120 Although New Zealand legislation was 
passed to extend jurisdiction over territorial seas in certain matters, it is unlikely that any 
legislation prior to the 1958 Geneva Convention, actually extended territorial sovereignty as 
such. 121 
Another mode of Crown acquisition of the territorial seabed would be through exercise of its 
prerogative.122 McNeil held that Crown acquisition in this way automatically excluded any 
aboriginal claims. 123 Given the Re the Ninety Mile Beach's rejection of the Crown's 
argument that the foreshores were acquired by prerogative, it is unlikely similar claims could 
be made to the territorial seabed.124
 
Since R v Keyn there has been confusion amongst the authorities as to whether the Imperial 
Crown acquired sovereignty over the territorial seabed. If it did then such sovereignty would 
probably be vested in the Crown in right of New Zealand since the Statute of Westminster 
was adopted in 1947.125 However it is unclear whether the Imperial Crown ever did acquire 
title to the seabeds either through legislation or exercise of its prerogative. The High Court 
of Australia in Bonser v La Macchia held as a fact, that at some date after R v Keyn in 1876 
the Imperial Crown had appropriated the territorial sea.1
26 Earlier cases were used to affirm 
this. 127 However there was no act of appropriation which was specifically identified. 
Although customary international law was expanding at this time to recognise territorial 
sovereignty in the seabed the better view is probably that no actual appropriation took place 
at all . 
l 19united Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, Jamaica, 10 Dec 1982) Articles 17-19. 
12°Keyn above nll4, 239. 
121 The Laws of New Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington, 1992) vol 2, Water, para 2. 
122Post Office v Estuary Radio [1968) 2 QB 740, 753. 
l23common Law Aboriginal Title above nl7, 103-105. 
124Re the Ninety Mile Beach above n81 , 477. 
125"The Legal Status of Maori Fishing Rights" above n56, 252. 
126(1969) 122 CLR 177, 187 and 223 . 
127 See for example, Secretary of State for India v Chelikani Rama Rao ( 1916) 85 LJPC 222. 
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3 Territorial sovereignty since the Geneva Convention 1958 
The uncertain nature of the Crown's sovereign rights over its territorial seabed at common 
law was illustrated in the previous section. This uncertainty means the status of aboriginal 
title in the seabed is also uncertain. The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone 1958 attempted to clarify the situation at international law. Article 1(1) 
held: "The sovereignty of a State extends, beyond its land territory and its internal waters, to 
a belt of sea adjacent to its coast, described as the territorial sea." According to Article 1(2) 
this sovereignty is subject to other provisions in the Convention. The most significant 
provision is Section 3 which allows the innocent passage of foreign ships in territorial 
waters. The Convention was implemented in New Zealand firstly by the Territorial Sea and 
Fishing Zone Act 1965 and then by the 1977 Act alluded to above. 128 There is no qualitative 
difference in the wording of both statutes with regard to the territorial seabed. 
Implementation in this way raises issues as to whether the territorial sovereignty recognised 
by international law is the same as the territorial sovereignty and its accompanying 
proprietary rights recognised by the common law. If it is, then under any conception of 
aboriginal title, the Crown's sovereignty will be burdened by indigenous rights. 
Once again however the nature of the sovereignty which was conceded by Article 1 of the 
Geneva Convention is uncertain. One view appears to be that once sovereignty over the 
territorial seabed has been appropriated by the adjoining state, it is the state which defines 
the extent of that sovereignty.129 This is a persuasive approach since the negotiations 
surrounding the Geneva Convention showed that all signatory states had a very different 
notion of what sovereignty was. 130 The question as to whether sovereignty in the seabed 
includes the ability of the Crown to either grant or recognise full proprietary rights in it is an 
especially contentious one. This problem is particularly important in a common law country 
such as New Zealand which distinguishes between the imperium, or sovereignty of the 
Crown, and dominium (proprietary rights) . 
128G Marston, P Skegg "The Boundaries of New Zealand in Constitutional Law" (1988) 13 NZULR 
1, 48. 
129op O'Connell International Law of the Sea (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982) 80. 
130Jntemational Law of the Sea above nl29, 82-83 . 
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Where the type of imperium acknowledged by international law over the 
seabed is more 
limited than the type of imperium over terra firma then it is likely that dom
inium over the 
seabed will be limited in a similar way. This is simply because dominium
, while clearly 
severable from imperium, still requires the presumption of Crown sovereignt
y over that area 
in the first place. 
In New Zealand's case, the words "subject to the grant of any estate or interest" in
 section 7 
of the 1977 Act suggests that the ability to grant full proprietary rights 
in the territorial 
seabed was at least contemplated by the legislators. This is important in
 relation to the 
international law question because it suggests that the New Zealand Parliam
ent thought their 
position at international law allowed it full imperium in the seabed. This i
nterpretation of 
international law also suggests therefore that full proprietary rights in the 
seabed, whether 
indigenous or otherwise, are capable of enforcement in New Zealand courts.
 
However there is also authority to suggest that the Geneva Convention's 
use of the word 
"sovereignty" did not include full imperium or the ability to recognise full pro
prietary rights. 
In the Seas and Submerged Lands Case two Australian High Court judges made 
comments 
to this effect. 131 The case itself centred on whether the Australian Parliamen
t had the ability 
to make laws relating to the territorial seabed. The Court was unanimous tha
t Parliament did 
have this ability. There was disagreement however on whether this includ
ed the ability to 
recognise proprietary rights in it. A majority held there was no such abil
ity. Barwick CJ 
(representing the majority) stated that the international concession of powe
r to states: "was 
not that the territory of the nation in a proprietary or physical sense was enl
arged to include 
the area of water in the territorial sea or the area of subjacent soil."
132 Mason J appeared to 
confirm this when he said: 133 
This is not to say that the seabed is territory in the sense that the land territor
y of the coastal 
state is territory. But it is to say that subject to the Convention and to the rul
es of international 
law the coastal state possesses that supreme authority over the bed and subso
il of territorial 
waters which it enjoys over its land mass ... (emphasis added) 
131(1975) 135 CLR 337. 
l3 2Seas and Submerged Lands Case above nl3 l, 363. 
l33seas and Submerged Lands Case above nl31 , 475 . 
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In essence therefore Mason J identified the seabed and terra firma as being essentially 
different pieces of land over which different types of imperium were exercised. This is 
probably because of the various international law obligations which exist in respect of the 
seabed which do not exist in respect of terra finna. As noted earlier, the right of innocent 
passage of foreign ships through the territorial sea is regarded as a particularly important 
international obligation. An obligation to protect the marine environment in this area 
probably also exists now under international law_ 134 
The 1998 case of Mary Yarmirr v The Northern Territory of Australia confirms this 
approach and provides observations on the type of aboriginal title which could be recognised 
in the seabed.135 The Federal Court affirmed the view of the Seas and Submerged Lands 
Case that there was a distinction between the type of sovereignty exercisable over land and 
the type of sovereignty exercisable over the seabed. 
136 This was because of the various 
restrictions imposed by the Geneva Convention in respect of the territorial seabed. These 
restrictions were outlined above. The Federal Court held that the enactment of the Seas and 
Submerged Lands Act itself was a recognition by the Australian Parliament of these 
international law obligations_ 137 
According to the Federal Court, these obligations meant that the extent of aboriginal title 
over the seabed was also limited. In particular, the Court was not prepared to award to the 
claimant the exclusive possession, occupation, and use of the waters which she desired .
138 
This of course is a right which Brennan J' s conception recognises over terra firma. 
134United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, above n 119, implemented in New Zealand by the 
United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea Act 1996. 
135Yarmirr above n107. 
136rarmirr above n107, para 132. 
137Yarmirr above nl07, para 133. 
138Yarmirr above nl07, para 136. 
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Ultimately, the type of aboriginal title which the claimants had in the seabed was a 
non-exclusive right to have free access to it for the following purposes: 
139 
i. To travel through or within the claimed area. 
ii . To fish, hunt, and gather for the purpose of satisfying their personal, domestic or 
non-commercial communal needs, including the purpose of observing traditional, cultural, 
ritual, and spiritual laws and customs. 
iii . To visit and protect places which are of cultural and spiritual importance. 
iv. To safeguard their cultural and spiritual knowledge. 
These rights of course are similar to the non-territorial rights asserted by McHugh and 
confirmed by Te Weehi, as existing in the New Zealand foreshore . They are rights which 
reflect traditional indigenous uses of the area. However, McHugh recognised non-territorial 
title as existing only because there had been partial extinguishment of the territorial title in 
the area.140 Yarmirr recognised the above interests because international law prevented it 
from awarding the exclusive possession, occupation, and use of the waters to the claimants. 
A dearth of New Zealand litigation in this area makes it difficult to ascertain the extent to 
which proprietary interests in the territorial seabed may be recognised here. However, there 
are strong arguments for suggesting the Yarmirr reasoning should be followed . As noted 
earlier, the 1977 Act could be regarded as simply declaratory of the international law 
obligations which were imposed by the 1958 Geneva Convention. In this way the 1977 Act 
is analogous to the Australian Seas and Submerged Lands Act. These international law 
obligations indicate that the Crown does not acquire the type of territorial sovereignty which 
would enable it to enforce full aboriginal proprietary rights in the seabed. A more limited 
form of aboriginal title would be all that could be recognised. 
l39Yarmirr above n107, para 161. 
140rhe Maori Magna Carta above n57, 139. 
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C Hingston J's Reasoning on Seabeds in the Marlborough Sounds Case 
Hingston J refused to accept the Crown's argument that section 7 of the 1977 Act vested 
both imperium and dominium in the territorial seabeds to the Crown. Hingston J thought 
that while section 7 statutorily assumed the imperium for the Crown, the same could not be 
claimed of the dominium . He held that to do so would effectively extinguish aboriginal rights 
by a "side wind".141 Hingston J stressed the fact that this was the first time Maori customary 
rights to the seabed had been before a court of competent jurisdiction.1
42 The Maori Land 
Court was considered to be competent for this purpose because section 7 had incorporated 
the seabed as part ofNew Zealand's territory. Likewise, there had been no legislation which 
excluded the Maori Land Court jurisdiction in this area. However this part of the paper has 
suggested that before awarding full proprietary rights (the Maori Land Court awards 
freehold title), an examination is firstly required of the ability of the Crown to grant them. 
The Crown's imperium may be simply of too limited a kind to enable it to do this. Certainly 
this is a matter which was not addressed by Hingston J. 
In the context of this paper, Hingston J's position at least accepts the declaratory nature of 
section 7, discussed on pages 29-31 of the paper. This would mean that the Crown' s 
territorial sovereignty as well as any burden of aboriginal title would be sourced in either the 
common law or the international law which existed when the 1977 Act was passed. 
With regard to the common law, Hingston J accepted the Crown's proposition that there 
was too much uncertainty prior to the 1958 Geneva Convention for proprietary rights to be 
recognised in the seabed.143 However Hingston J's acceptance of the applicant's argument 
that he must look to Tikanga Maori rather than the common law when ascertaining 
aboriginal title, is a little confusing.144 Hingston J may have been applying a conception 
similar to Brennan J to consider the content and incidents of aboriginal title as being sourced 
in pre-European times rather than in the common law itself This is of course distinguishable 
from McNeil's conception which essentially regarded aboriginal title as a common law right. 
141Marlborough Sounds (1997) 22A Nelson MB 9. 
142Marlborough Sounds above nl41. 
143Marlborough Sounds (1997) 22A Nelson MB 6. 
144Marlborough Sounds (1997) 22A Nelson MB 7. 
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However, even Brennan J's conception assumed that the Crown took territorial sovereignty 
and radical title to the land it claimed. 145 This is because aboriginal title must still be an 
interest which is cognisable by the common law. It is this radical title from which proprietary 
claims and aboriginal title claims may be made. Therefore, if the Crown does not acquire 
territorial sovereignty to the seabed at all, whether through the common law or international 
law, it is difficult to see how aboriginal claims may be made also. Reference to Tikanga 
Maori should probably only have been made when the source of the Crown's radical title to 
the seabed had been ascertained. 
With regard to the international law, both Hingston J and the Crown appeared to accept that 
the Crown acquired full territorial sovereignty and radical title to the seabed, when the 1958 
Geneva Convention was passed.146 In doing so, both parties also apparently accepted the 
argument, alluded to on page 34, that New Zealand was then able to define the nature of the 
territorial sovereignty itself If this is the case, then this sovereignty would be burdened with 
aboriginal title because the common law in New Zealand at present operates on that 
presumption. It is unlikely that section 7 of the 1977 Act would extinguish this title because 
it is not explicit enough to do so. However, the Seas and Submerged Lands Case and 
Yarmirr both suggest that the territorial sovereignty conceded by international law may be of 
too limited a kind, for full aboriginal proprietary rights to be recognised. Indeed, even 
Brennan J's conception which recognises occupancy rights only, was rejected by Yarmirr . 
Certainly it is a matter which requires further litigation in New Zealand. Determining the 
nature of proprietary interests in the seabed' s soil is probably an issue which a higher New 
Zealand court must decide. 
D Summary of Aboriginal Title in the Seabed 
The mam issue m relation to the seabed is whether the Crown acqmres the type of 
sovereignty in it which would enable the Crown to enforce full aboriginal proprietary rights. 
The international law stemming from the 1958 Geneva Convention and implemented in New 
Zealand by 1965 and 1977 statutes, is the most likely source for this . 
145 As noted earlier however, Michael Mansell has argued that Brennan J's conception, if taken to its logical 
conclusion, would also deny territorial sovereignty to the Crown. "The Court Gives an Inch" above n26, 5. 
I46Marlborough Sounds (1997) 22A Nelson MB 6. 
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If the reasoning from the Australian authorities is adopted then this has important 
implications for the types of aboriginal title which could be recognised. It would firstly mean 
that the Maori Land Court would not have the jurisdiction to grant a freehold title. New 
Zealand's international law obligations would prevent this. It would also mean that Brennan 
J's conception of occupation rights, would be rejected, at least to the extent it is exclusive. 
Yarmirr is authority on this point. 
However, there are other incidents of aboriginal title. They could be enforced through the 
ordinary court process in New Zealand and the degree of its exclusivity and manner of 
extinguishment would probably also require judicial determination. Also, the Crown' s 
obligation to consult with Maori on matters pertaining to the seabed, cannot be discounted. 
R v Keyn illustrated that, while the Crown was incapable of full territorial sovereignty over 
the seabed, its courts were still capable of exercising jurisdiction over it. The Crown in its 
Executive or Legislative capacity has also been empowered to make decisions regarding the 
seabed. The international law has not changed this. The fiduciary obligation incumbent upon 
the Crown, suggests Maori must be involved in any decisionmaking process. There is 
Canadian authority in particular which supports this conclusion.
147 
VI EFFECTS OF ABORIGINAL TITLE ON RMA COASTAL PERMITTING 
A Introduction 
The Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) is not a statute pertaining to the ownership of 
foreshores and the seabed per se. Instead it is a statute which promotes the sustainable 
management of these resources according to section 5. Accordingly, the Environment Court 
has held that it is the inappropriate forum to deal with the issue of proprietary rights.
148 
Recognising aboriginal title in the coastal area however could have an impact on whether 
local authorities have the jurisdiction to make management decisions relating to the coastal 
environment at all . Even if aboriginal title did not restrict this jurisdiction, it is certainly a 
significant matter which local authorities would have to consider in any decisions on the 
foreshores and seabed. 
147 Delgamuukw above n40, 264. 
148Haddon v A uckland Regional Council [1994] NZRMA 49, 56-57. 
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This part of the paper discusses the various effects which aboriginal title will have on these 
issues. The RMA's emphasis on management rather than ownership is shown by the way it 
separates the right to carry on certain activities, from the right to occupy land for carrying 
out those activities. For instance, on terra firma, any restricted activity requires a resource 
consent. A resource consent will be issued where this is consistent with sustainable 
management. However, the consent holder does not acquire occupation rights as well. The 
right of occupation must be negotiated privately with the landowner before the consent's 
activity can be exercised. In this way, the issue of a resource consent does not impact on the 
ownership of the land. 
In relation to the coastal marine area the separation of these rights does not occur. The 
coastal marine area is the relevant area in the Marlborough Sounds case. According to 
section 2 of the RMA it includes the foreshore, seabed, coastal water, and air space above 
the water. The coastal marine area has various restricted activities for which a coastal permit 
is usually required .149 The rights to occupy and remove materials from the coastal marine 
area are outlined in section 12(2). Subject to the same exceptions as in section 12(1), a 
coastal permit is required for these rights also. 
The right of occupation is expressed to be exclusive of others in section 12(4)(a)(ii). 
However the extent of this exclusion right is unclear. Section 122( 5)( c) for instance states 
that a coastal permit cannot be regarded as authority for the holder to occupy an area to the 
exclusion of others. The lack of clarity on this point is illustrated by various Environment 
Court decisions. In Aqua King Limited (Anakoha Bay) v The Marlborough District Council 
for example, Kenderdine J stated that the local iwi, Ngati Kuia in this case, would be legally 
excluded from the relevant site if a coastal permit was issued.150 Both Director General of 
Conservation v The Marlborough District Council and Greensill v Waikato Regional 
Council however held that there was practical or de facto exclusion from the relevant site 
only_ 151 
149 According to section 12(1), the only exceptions to this include: an express authorisation by a rule in a 
r~onal coastal plan or a proposed regional coastal plan, or a resource consent. 
1 (30 June 1997) unreported, Environment Court, Decision No W 71/97, 14. 
151 (22 September 1997) unreported, Environment Court, Decision No W 89/97, 13 and (4 March i995) 
unreported, Planning Tribunal, Hamilton, Decision No 17/95, 10. 
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If this was indeed the case then there would appear to be strong arguments to su
ggest that 
any indigenous rights in the area remain unextinguished and should be c
apable of being 
enjoyed by local iwi. New Zealand courts after all have indicated an 
unwillingness to 
extinguish by a "side wind"_ 152 
Perhaps the better view is that legal exclusion does occur to the exte
nt to which the 
occupation by others would be inconsistent with the permitted activity. 
Of course, this 
exclusion would vary depending on the type of activity or use which th
e coastal permit 
allowed. In relation to the issuance of marine farming licences, practice at le
ast suggests that 
the public retains certain access rights to the sites. These rights are often i
ncorporated into 
the agreement between individual marine farms and the issuing authority.
153 
Despite the uncertainty surrounding exclusion, once a coastal permit has
 been issued, no 
further consent from the Crown is required to exercise its rights.
154 This is based on the 
presumption that the Crown owns the land in the coastal marine area becaus
e the rights of 
access and occupation are determined solely by statutory process rather
 than by private 
negotiation with landowners. This distinction with the resource consent pr
ocess relating to 
terra firma is apparent. The presumption of Crown ownership is also shown
 by section 12(2) 
itself which applies to "land of the Crown" or land "vested in the regional 
council", and by 
section 112, which obliges coastal permit holders to pay rent to the Crown. 
B The Effect of Maori Freehold Title on Coastal Permits 
If the Marlborough Sounds case is affirmed by higher authority, then, where t
he coastal 
blocks were purchased from Maori by the Crown, the Maori Land 
Court will have 
jurisdiction to issue freehold title in the coastal marine area. This would als
o undermine the 
presumption of Crown ownership of the coastal marine area. The conseque
nt impact on the 
rights conferred by the existing coastal permits is more difficult to ascertai
n. As suggested 
on page 40, the Environment Court has indicated an unwillingness to deal 
with proprietary 
issues. 
152Fau/knor above n30. 
153Personal interview with Grant Powell , legal counsel for Te Tau lhu iwi, 2
1 September 1998. 
154section 354(3) of the Resource Management Act 1991. 
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This was further illustrated in Greensill when Treadwell J stated: 155 
Determinations of Treaty issues as between the Crown and the appellants [coastal iwi] would 
simply resolve the question of who is landlord. Thus should ownership change during the time a 
marine farming licence was in force that would not of itself terminate the licence unless legislation 
made changes to rights of occupation protected by the licence. 
Although Treaty issues are dealt with by the Waitangi Tribunal which is able to make 
recommendations only, the situation is certainly analogous to Maori Land Court rulings. The 
Maori Land Court decides ownership issues when it awards freehold title. 
However, it is the presumption of Crown ownership which seems to underlie the ability to 
issue exclusive occupation rights in coastal marine areas. Rebutting this presumption by 
acknowledging that the Maori Land Court has jurisdiction in this area appears to impair the 
ability of consent authorities to issue these rights and allow them to be recognised by the 
Environment Court. This is, of course, anomalous to the "hands off'' approach which the 
Environment Court has asserted in resource management issues. The preferable solution to 
prevent this anomaly in the future would appear to be an amendment to the RMA to 
separate the right to carry out a restricted activity in the coastal marine area from the right to 
occupy.156 The amendment would institute a regime similar to the resource consent process 
relating to terra firma. That is, the Crown could authorise the right to carry out a certain 
activity ( such as marine farming), but the right to occupy portions of the foreshore and 
seabed to enjoy this activity, would require negotiation with coastal iwi. This is simply 
because coastal iwi would have freehold title to the coastal area upon a Maori Land Court 
determination. 
Such an amendment would also have an impact on the payment of coastal rents. Presently, 
coastal permit holders who occupy space in the coastal marine area are obliged to pay rent 
to the Crown.157 The amounts payable are set out in regulations empowered by section 360 
oftheRMA. 
155(4 March 1995) unreported, Planning Tribunal, Hamilton, Decision No 17/95, 5. 
156Fiona McLeod, "Maori Customary Title to the Foreshore and Seabed and the Allocation of Coastal 
Permits under the Act" (1998) 2 BRMB 101 , 103 . 
157 Section 112 of the Resource Management Act 1991 . 
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This regime has proved particularly controversial and in October 1994 the Government 
commissioned a review of it. 158 Subsequent to this, an amendment to the RMA was passed 
in 1997 which now gives regional councils rather than central Government, the option of 
introducing charging regimes for occupation through regional coastal plans.
159 Maori have 
expressed strong objections to the rights of others to impose coastal rents at all.
160 
Indeed, some coastal iwi have asserted that they, as owners of the foreshore and seabed, 
should be the bodies capable of collecting and benefiting from such charges.
161 A Maori 
Land Court ruling which grants Maori freehold in the coastal marine area, and a subsequent 
RMA amendment to acknowledge this, would certainly make these assertions more 
persuasive than before. Existing coastal permit holders may be required to pay coastal rents 
to their new "landlord", coastal iwi, rather than to regional councils or the Crown. 
C The Impact of Other Forms of Aboriginal Title on Local Authority 
Decisionmaking 
1 General 
The uncertain effects of awarding Maori freehold title in coastal marine areas suggests that 
higher courts may continue to deny the sort of jurisdiction to the Maori Land Court over the 
foreshores and seabed which Hingston J claimed in the Marlborough Sounds case. There are 
strong indications however that aboriginal title, of some sort, would still be recognised in the 
coastal marine area. On pages 24 and 25, this paper used the example of Te Weehi as a New 
Zealand case which recognised McHugh's non-territorial title over the foreshore . Similarly, 
as noted on pages 36 and 37, Yarmirr identified a Brennan J occupation right as an 
aboriginal interest in the seabed. Neither of these interests regard aboriginal title as being the 
same as a fee simple one. 
158wayne Kimber Coastal Rentals Under the RMA: Report Under Contract to the Minister for the 
Environment October 1994. 
159Section 12 of the Resource Management Amendment Act 1997. 
160submissions to Coastal Rentals Under the RMA above nl58. Hauraki Maori Trust Board [Paeroa] subm 
271 , Ngaiterangi Iwi lncorp Soc [Tauranga] subm 310, Ngai Tahu Trust Board subm 311. 
l61Subm 310 and 311 to Coastal Rentals Under the RMA above nl58. 
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Both Brennan J's occupation right and McHugh's non-territorial title, are potentially 
inconsistent with the occupation and removal rights which a consent authority can award in 
section 12(2) of the RMA. This is because, according to section 12(4), the rights awarded 
are exclusive of others. The uncertainty surrounding the nature of this exclusion was 
discussed earlier. However, in an activity such as marine farming, even if coastal iwi were 
not legally excluded by the statutory provisions, there would often be factual exclusion 
anyway. The rights to collect shellfish and enjoy other customary rights over the foreshore 
and seabed may be difficult to exercise amongst the various structures which a marine farm 
uses. The question of whether or not an inconsistency actually exists is probably a factual 
issue which requires determination in each case. 162 Where there is no inconsistency then 
clearly Maori will be entitled to continue to enjoy their customary rights in the area. Where a 
factual inconsistency does occur however, there are two possibilities which could result. 
Both of these possibilities will be examined in tum. 
2 Section 12 of the RMA as a restrictive provision 
The RMA does not expressly extinguish aboriginal title. Indeed, as noted earlier, the statute 
does not profess to deal with issues of ownership at all. This paper has also shown that New 
Zealand authorities regard extinguishment by implication as extinguishment by a "side 
wind".163 Because of this, statutory provisions which impliedly extinguish aboriginal title 
would not be viewed favourably by the courts. 
However, there are also arguments to suggest that the RMA's statutory management 
controls effectively amount to the extinguishment of indigenous proprietary rights in the 
foreshore and seabed. 164 That is, a declaration by the High Court that iwi had aboriginal title 
to these resources would have little practical effect because of the management regime in 
place. This remains an issue which future courts may have to decide. What is worth noting at 
this stage however, is that extinguishment in this manner suggests a serious breach of the 
Crown's fiduciary obligation to Maori . Indeed there would be powerful arguments in favour 
of a right of compensation for coastal iwi from the Crown (as per Jka Whenua) . 
162Personal interview with Grant Powell, above nl53. 
163 Faulknor above n30. 
164This possibility was raised by Richard Boast in Resource Management (Brookers, Wellington, 1991) 
binder IA, Treaty of Waitangi and Maori Resource Management Issues, para 1.05. 
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The case of Falkner v Gisbome District Council is especially relevant to this discussion.
165 
The case centred on concerns by coastal residents that the Crown was no longer taking 
measures to prevent erosion along the waterfront. The residents argued firstly that the 
Crown had a common law duty to protect land from encroachment by the sea.
166 Secondly, 
the residents argued that they themselves had a common law right to protect their land from 
the inroads of the sea. 167 However, Barker J held that, while these common law rights 
existed, they were no longer applicable because they were inconsistent with the scheme of 
the RMA. 168 In particular, Barker J thought that the right of an individual to protect her 
property from the sea was inconsistent with the resource consent procedure envisaged by 
the RMA. Hence, any protection work must be subject to that procedure. 
This case certainly suggests that any practical inconsistency between the exercise of rights 
granted by the RMA and the continued enjoyment of common law rights should be decided 
in favour of the RMA provisions. The doctrine of aboriginal title arises from the common 
law. Falkner may therefore be used as a basis for arguing that, to the extent of any 
inconsistency, section 12 of the RMA restricts the enjoyment of aboriginal title in the area. 
This does not amount to an extinguishment as such. Indeed Tawa v Bay of Plenty Regional 
Council is authority for the proposition that the grant of a coastal permit does not amount to 
a permanent denial of the rights claimed by iwi.
169 However, it would mean that indigenous 
proprietary rights should be subordinated to the rights conferred by a coastal permit. 
The Australian case of Wik may be used by way of analogy. 
170 The granting of pastoral 
leases in that case is similar to the granting of coastal permits in the Marlborough Sounds 
case. Indeed, in section 12(4)(a)(iii) of the RMA, the right to occupy a part of the coastal 
marine area is considered to resemble a lease or licence. Also, the sort of aboriginal title 
recognised by Wik is similar to the non-freehold conceptions of aboriginal title which this 
paper has addressed. Brennan CJ, representing the majority in Wik held that the mere 
granting of a pastoral lease did not extinguish aboriginal title.
171 
165(1995] 3 NZLR 622 [Falkner] . 
166Falkner above nl65, 628. 
167 Falkner above n165, 630. 
168Falkner above n165, 632. 
169(24 March 1995) unreported, Planning Tribunal, Auckland, Decision No A 18/95, 9 in citing Sea Tow 
Limited Decision No 129/93 . 
170(1996) 187 CLR 1 [Wik] . 
171Wikabove n170, 87-88. 
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However, he also concluded that the rights of lessees prevailed over the rights of Aborigines 
to the extent of any inconsistency.172 Indeed Brennan CJ held that an inconsistency 
extinguished aboriginal title. 173 Tawa v Bay of Plenty Regional Council, alluded to above, is 
authority illustrating that aboriginal title could not be extinguished in this way in New 
Zealand's coastal marine area. However, Wik at least supports the proposition that the 
aboriginal rights which are inconsistent with the practice of marine farming, would be held in 
abeyance for the period of the coastal permit. 
Barker Jin Falkner also made some interesting observations regarding compensation for the 
residents in that case. While the RMA did not provide for compensation, Barker J suggested 
that a provision similar to section 19 of the United Kingdom Coast Protection Act 1949, 
would be a worthwhile amendment. 174 Section 19(1) provides for compensation to the 
extent to which a person's interest in land has been depreciated by coastal protection work. 
This concern over compensation for the abrogation of private property rights was reiterated 
by Jka Whenua in relation to the abrogation of indigenous property rights. Although there 
are no compensation provisions in the RMA itself to assist Maori, there certainly appear to 
be compelling reasons why the RMA's infringement of customary rights should be duly and 
justly compensated. 
3 Restrictions on the section 12 rights 
An alternative view of section 12 suggests that it does not restrict aboriginal title. Falkner 
can be distinguished because it dealt with the common law rights of private property owners. 
New Zealand courts in recent times have shown a reluctance to restrict indigenous property 
rights in the same way, particularly where there is no express statutory restriction. This 
provides for indigenous rights to be viewed as restrictive of the types of rights which a 
coastal permit recognises under section 12. 
l72Wik above nl70, 88. 
173 Wik above nl 70, 95. 
174Falkner above nl65, 633 . 
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Firstly however, it is important to note that if a Brennan J or McHugh type aboriginal title 
continues to exist in the coastal marine area, it is unlikely that consent authorities could be 
viewed as lacking the jurisdiction to issue permits for the occupation of coastal space under 
section 12(2) of the RMA. The lack of jurisdiction was suggested earlier as a possibility if 
the Marlborough Sounds case was confirmed by higher courts. A similar argument in 
relation to other forms of indigenous rights should be less persuasive because otherwise, 
there would be a failure to distinguish between the Maori freehold title which the Maori 
Land Court awards (a McNeil conception), and the types of interest conceived by Brennan J 
and McHugh. The better argument is probably that an aboriginal occupation or 
non-territorial title simply restricts the sort of occupation rights which have been conferred 
by coastal permits. Aboriginal title would also require local authorities to grant coastal iwi a 
significant role in the decisionmaking process, and would probably result in a greater 
reluctance to issue coastal permits in the future . The Crown' s fiduciary obligations appear to 
require this. 
Section 12( 4) stipulates the extent of the occupation rights conferred by a coastal permit. 
They are rights which exclude others, except those who have a relevant resource consent, 
or an allowance under a rule in a regional coastal plan or proposed regional coastal plan. 
Unextinguished aboriginal title could be recognised therefore by implementing a rule in a 
regional coastal plan which confirms it. This would not create a new property right as such 
but would simply declare an existing indigenous property right which has thus far been 
ignored by the legislation. The problems posed by Falkner would also be circumvented since 
aboriginal title would be within the scheme of the RMA rather than simply being a right 
which existed independently of it. While the fee simple in the land in the coastal marine area 
would remain with the Crown, Maori would also be entitled to exercise their traditional 
rights of occupation and removal from the area. Indeed these are the rights which both 
Brennan J and McHugh thought were the significant indigenous proprietary rights. 
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This proposed solution could of course create practical difficulties. In effect, it would 
amount to two parties having occupation rights to the same area of land. Many Maori would 
undoubtedly consider this unsatisfactory. In one marine farming case, Director General of 
Conservation v Marlborough District Council, it was the perception of alienation from 
traditional resources which iwi were concerned about rather than actual access to those 
resources in itself 175 In Marlborough Seafoods Limited v Marlborough District Council, it 
was the pollution of the seabed from the shell and organic fall created by a marine farm with 
which coastal iwi were concemed.176 It is unclear therefore whether this solution would be 
workable. Certainly for it to be so, a spirit of negotiation and compromise would be required 
by both iwi and holders of the coastal permits. 
The recognition of a Brennan J or McHugh type aboriginal title in the coastal marine area 
requires the active participation of local iwi in decisions relating to the future issue of coastal 
permits. A fiduciary relationship requires this. There are presently two lines of authority 
regarding the consultation requirement. One line of authority establishes a duty on consent 
authorities to consult local iwi. 177 The other line of authority suggests consultation is good 
practice but is not mandatory for local authorities to exercise. 178 A finding of aboriginal title 
of some sort in the coastal marine area should strengthen Maori rights in this area and would 
therefore appear to favour the former approach, since it promotes the active participation of 
iwi in the decisionmaking process. This is more compatible with the fiduciary obligations 
which Delgamuukw recognised as incumbent on the Crown when aboriginal title is 
confirmed. 
Aboriginal title is also relevant in relation to the RMA Part II principles which consent 
authorities must consider before issuing coastal permits. Indeed Maori access to their 
traditional kaimoana areas has already been treated as a Part II matter which should be 
considered. 179 
175(22 September 1997) unreported, Environment Court, Decision No W 89/97, 13 . 
176(20 February 1998) unreported, Environment Court, Decision No W 12/98, 7. 
177 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney General [1987] 1 NZLR 641; Gill v Rotorua District Council p 993] 2 NZRMA 604; Haddon v Auckland Regional Council [1994] NZRMA 49. 
78Greensill v Waikato Regional Council 4 NZPTD 241 ; Hanton v Auckland City Council [1994] NZRMA 
289 . 
179AquaKingabovenl50, 13-15. 
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For instance, aboriginal title could be regarded as an important part of cultural well being 
under section 5(2). Under section 6(e), local authorities must recognise and provide for the 
relationship of Maori and their culture and traditions with their water. Aboriginal title makes 
this section particularly important. The principle of kaitiakitanga in section 7(a) would also 
include notions of aboriginal title as would the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi in section 
8. While none of these provisions can override the central purpose of sustainable 
management in section 5, it is likely that the recognition of aboriginal title would accord 
them greater priority than before. 
The New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement (NZCPS) would also be affected by a finding of 
aboriginal title in the coastal marine area. The NZCPS is important to consent authorities for 
two reasons. Firstly, the regional coastal plan must not be inconsistent with it.180 Secondly, 
the consent authority must "have regard" to the NZCPS when deciding on whether a coastal 
permit should be issued.181 The importance of customary seafood resources is already 
expressly recognised by section 58(b) of the RMA_ 182 Aboriginal title in these resources 
results in this provision assuming greater prominence as a matter which decisionmakers 
"must have regard to" according to section 104(l)(c). 
In particular, Policy l.l.3(a), (b), and (c) of the NZCPS state that it is a national priority to 
protect features which are themselves essential elements of the coastal environment. In Aqua 
King the Anakoha Bay coastline was treated as being protected under this provision because 
of the special spiritual, historical, and cultural significance of it to local iwi in accordance 
with Tikanga Maori _ 183 Tikanga Maori is defined in section 2 of the RMA as meaning Maori 
customary values and practices. In order to satisfy the evidential requirements for aboriginal 
title, it is likely that this definition will have to be met. Once this is done however, courts 
could utilise Policy 1.1.3 to expressly protect Maori interests in the coastal areas. As well as 
Policy 1.1.3, Policy 4.2 .1 is also relevant. This Policy recognises the relationship of Maori 
and their culture and traditions with their ancestral lands. 
180section 67(2) of the Resource Management Act 1991 . 
l 8 l Section 104( 1 )( c) of the Resource Management Act 1991. 
182Mahinga maataitai is defined in section 2 of the Resource Management Act 1991 as the areas from 
which food resources from the sea are gathered. 
183 A qua King above nl50, 9. 
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D The Impact of Aboriginal Title on Coastal Tendering 
The Te Tau Thu iwi claim in the Marlborough Sounds was prompted by Government plans 
to tender out the water space there for marine farms.
184 Part VII of the RMA enables the 
Crown to do this. Coastal tendering is a process which allows the Crown to choose between 
competing applicants for the same coastal space and to maximise financial return to the 
Crown for the occupation of that space. The process therefore also rests on the presumption 
of Crown ownership of the coastal marine area. 
Tenders are made for an "authorisation"_ 185 This is something which an applicant for certain 
coastal permits within an area could be required to hold before a coastal permit application 
is considered. Once an authorisation is granted, an Order in Council may be made to direct 
regional councils not to grant coastal permits in that area.1
86 To carry out a restricted 
activity in the coastal marine area, the holder of an authorisation must still apply for a coastal 
permit.187 Clearly however, an authorisation in an area would prevent coastal permits being 
issued to others in respect of that area. 
There are strong suggestions that any type of aboriginal title in the foreshore and seabed 
would undermine the Crown's ability to tender out the coastal marine area. Certainly the 
granting of Maori freehold title would appear to have this effect and even indigenous 
occupational or non-territorial title would at least restrict the range of rights which an 
authorisation could confer. However, Falkner could also be used as authority for the 
contrary proposition. That is, because coastal tendering is included in the RMA, its 
provisions must be given precedence over aboriginal title. The Ngai Tahu Claims Settlement 
Bill provides a useful illustration of how Ngai Tahu proposes to resolve this difficulty within 
the purview of the RMA. In section 305 of the Bill, Ngai Tahu acknowledges the right of 
the Crown to tender out the coastline but retains the preferential right to purchase 10 
percent of the area of the authorisations granted_ 188 
l84<http://tvone.co.nz/news/general/22Dec1304.htm1> (last modified 22 December 1997). 
185 Section 161 of the Resource Management Act 1991. 
186section 152 of the Resource Management Act 1991. 
l 87 Section 162 of the Resource Management Act 1991. 
188section 305(2)(a) of the Ngai Tahu Claims Settlement Bill 1998. 
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Ngai Tahu is further deemed to have lodged a valid tender for the authorisations upon 
payment of one dollar to the Crown in remuneration. 189 This type of settlement process, 
ultimately to be codified by legislation, may be a method by which other coastal iwi could 
ensure that their aboriginal rights are satisfactorily enforced. 
VII CONCLUSION 
The presumption of Crown ownership of the foreshores and seabed has formed the basis of 
the general public's access to these areas throughout New Zealand's history. It also forms 
the basis for the various rights which the Crown grants under the RMA. Jn Re Marlborough 
Sounds Foreshore and Seabed is a case, presently awaiting a decision from the Maori 
Appellate Court, which uses the doctrine of aboriginal title to challenge this presumption. 
This paper has used the case to prompt discussion on the possible implications of this 
challenge, for Maori and non-Maori alike. 
Firstly, the paper examined the various conceptions of aboriginal title and the part they have 
played in recognising indigenous proprietary rights. New Zealand's statutory history 
suggests McNeil's conception of aboriginal title has been particularly influential in this 
country. However, other conceptions were also analysed in this paper because they provide 
alternative characterisations of indigenous rights which could be utilised by future New 
Zealand courts. These alternative conceptions include: Brennan J's judgment in Mabo, the 
Canadian conception in Delgamuukw, and McHugh's non-territorial title. 
New Zealand's legal history regarding aboriginal title in the foreshore was then summarised. 
Re the Ninety Mile Beach is the crucial authority here. This case held that the Maori Land 
Court investigation of coastal blocks extinguished aboriginal title in the foreshore itself I 
outlined the controversy surrounding this case and the reasons why a modem Court of 
Appeal may be more willing than ever before to reconsider the decision. However, the public 
policy concerns of freehold ownership of the foreshore, were also discussed. These concerns 
would probably form the basis for affirming the Re the Ninety Mile Beach principle. 
l89section 307(1) of the Ngai Tahu Claims Settlement Bill 1998. 
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This would not mean that Maori could not have any proprietary rights in the foreshore . Te 
Weehi is authority for this. Instead it means that the alternative conceptions of aboriginal 
title, alluded to above, would have to be utilised by the courts. 
At present, there is a dearth of critical discussion on the legal regime of New Zealand's 
seabed. This paper alleviates the situation somewhat by introducing some of the key issues 
involved. In particular, the paper suggests that the uncertain nature of the Crown' s territorial 
sovereignty in the seabed corresponds to an uncertainty over whether proprietary rights 
(including aboriginal title), can be recognised in it. 
If section 7 of the Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977 
is considered to be a declaratory provision, then New Zealand's view of its international law 
position is especially important. This view is unclear however. One approach appears to be 
that the Crown acquires full imperium in the seabed. If this approach is adopted then full 
proprietary rights exist also, and the Maori Land Court is capable of awarding freehold title 
in it. Alternatively, the Crown may only acquire a more limited type of imperium because of 
its international law obligations regarding the seabed. This approach would not enable full 
proprietary rights to be recognised as such. The Australian authorities of Seas and 
Submerged Lands Case and Yarmirr support this latter view. Once again however, this 
would not deny aboriginal rights to the seabed altogether. These rights would simply be of a 
more limited kind which the Maori Land Court itself is incapable of awarding. 
The final part of this paper analysed the potential effects of the various types of aboriginal 
title on coastal permitting under the RMA. In particular, if the Maori Land Court's 
jurisdiction to award aboriginal title in the foreshore and seabed (the coastal marine area), is 
affirmed, then an amendment would probably be required to the RMA. This amendment 
would be required because the presumption of Crown ownership could no longer be made. 
Separating the right to occupy the coastal marine area from the right to carry out a restricted 
activity there, is a necessary consequence of this. The impact of other conceptions of 
aboriginal title on the coastal permitting regime, is less clear. This paper has introduced 
several possibilities resulting from the recognition of these types of indigenous rights. 
Certainly these possibilities raise issues which future Environment Courts will be required to 
address. 
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